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Danish social policy seems to move into a neo-liberal direction. The social policy is 
increasingly marked by tightening rules and increased control for people who are not able to 
comply with societal norms. This development has impact on, for instance, ethnic minority 
groups (lower allowances, greater demands for language abilities, postponed possibilities for 
getting citizenship), cash benefit receivers (lower allowances, and demands of activation in 
various projects in repay for this allowance), criminals (who are punished harder than before) 
- and on families with placed children (or in risk of  placement). This last group is in focus in 
this paper. Through one hundred years the society has increasingly tried to integrate these 
families; in the beginning of the late century through compulsion and from the midth of the 
20th century onwards through a still increasing row of ‘offers’. Now again, control and 
pressure seem to invade the conception of the ‘right’ attitude to those families (Julkunen & 
Harder 2004).  
 
It is my intention with this paper to make propable that redistribution and recognition would 
be more valuable alternatives for integration of these families. Moreover, I raise the question  
why children from female headed lone-parent-families seem to be in much greater risk for 
being placed outside their homes than children from two-parent-families.  
  
In order to explore this I will draw on critical theory. On the macro level, the paper will be 
informed by Jürgen  Habermas’ thoughts about women’s general status in society; about 
certain group’s risks of getting further stigmatised by society’s intentions of offering them 
special and positive support, and about families’ risk of developing functional disturbances, 
when society (public authorities) intervene in the families with the law in hand (Habermas 
1997, 1996). Some families react on this colonization by protesting and resisting. Axel 
Honneth’s concept of recognition (which he has adopted from Hegel) offers some 
concretization of such reactions to colonialisation. In this connection, I will shortly introduce 
Honneth’s and Nancy Fraser’s discussion about the concepts of recognition and redistribution 
and how these concepts according to Fraser and Honneth should be related to each other 
(Fraser & Honneth 2003, Honneth 2003, 1995). Furthermore, Michel Foucault’s thoughts of 
the creation of the modern family institution will inspire me to explore the current society’s 
conception of the lone-parent-family (Foucault 2002 a + b).                   
 
Empirically, I will present figures concerning the content of placed children, the reasons for 
their placement as they are explained by the public authorities, and their families’ 
characteristics. From my own study I will present some findings about placement of children 
through one hundred year (Harder 2000). Today’s share of poor lone-parent-families will be 
encircled (Hansen 2005). Furthermore, I will try to make the daily life experience of poverty 
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even more concrete by using a socio-psychological nordic poverty study (Unterlid 2005). I 
will start with the empirical data.  
 
Empirical data  
Most placements of children outside their own homes take place as voluntary arrangements, 
i.e. that parents and perhaps the children themselves accept the public suggestions about the 
placement. For about 12% of all, the arrangement has happened without the parents’ and 
perhaps the children’s will and wish. At the end of 2004, the number of all placed children 
was 14.074 while the compulsory placements amounted to 1.222.  Bryderup argues that about 
1% of the child population, at any time through one hundred years, has been placed outside 
home (Bryderup 2005). As concern the children, placed by compulsion, this share has 
changed rather dramatically over time. For instance, the share was 3% in 1987(Hestbæk 
1997).  
 
The public intervention in families’ lives is caused by two main reasons - either it is supposed 
that the children’s environments are far from satisfactory and that this has a heavy influence 
on the children’s lives, or that the child suffers from severy problems related first and 
foremost to itself. The families were often characterized by accumulated difficulties. In my 
own qualitative study (Harder 2000, 1997) concerning voluntary associations’ support to 
families with (compulsorily) placed children, the associations report that they were addressed 
by and gave counselling to mainly lone-parent-families . Besides bearing this status, the 
families were characterized by the parent being currently or permanently marginalised from 
the labour market and in consequence of this by having a modest economy or being poor. The 
background for being a lone parent was often divorce/family dissolution. The parent was 
almost always a women. She often carried with her other problems such as mental and 
psysical illnesses and/or dependency on drugs, alcohol and medicine. Some parents had 
themselves been placed outside their homes as children. Many of them had experienced 
severe conditions in their childhood. Other studies, especially using quantative methods, 
confirm this picture (for example Hestbæk 1997, Christoffersen 2002, Ploug 2003, 
Egelund/Hestbæk 2004). The children’s ‘own’ problems are defined by the social services as 
severe social difficulties; school problems; not wishing to remain at home; developmental 
problems and mental illnesses or disabilities (Hestbæk 1997). Rather many of the placed 
children have often problems of a character similar to abused children (Christoffersen 2002).  
 
Public intervention concerning children’s conditions in families has been covered by Dansih 
law at least since 1905: the law concerning criminal and neglected children. This law - as any 
later law in the area - distinguishes between dangerous children and children in danger 
(Egelund 1997, Løkke 1990). Even if the law has been modernised during the last century the 
main message concerning compulsory placed children is still the same.                     
 
Lone female parents in comparison with women from two-parents-families 
Hansen (2005) states, that there are in Denmark currently about 115.000 families with one 
parent, i.e. roughly 4% of all households (including singles and families without children). 
Since 1999 the  number has increased by about 10% and the number of these families’ 
children by 14%. That  means that around 20% of families with children consist of one or 
more children and one parent. The parent will for 90% be a woman (Halskov et al. 2000).   
  
As to education these parents have relatively low education compared with other women. 5% 
have an  academic education. Lone parents with more than two children represent the lowest 
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level of all women1. Two thirds of them are in the labour market2 while the comparable 
figure is 90% of women in two-parents-families (Hansen 2005). Half of the women have 
received comtemporary public allowances for some of the year 2003, while one fourth 
received such allowances for most of the same year. Lone female parents are in very varied 
economic situations. Looking at family income they earn from 100.000 to 400.000 D.kr. per 
year. 6% of lone parents with one child had in 2002 available income lower than EU’s 
poverty border of 50% of medium income while the number was13% when looking at the 
60% border3. This means that lone female parents are not as a whole a vulnerable group but 
those who are (and their children) are in a marginalised position with serious consequences. It 
is the latter group I concentrate on in this paper.  
      
CASA (Centre for Alternative Societal Analysis) who produced the above figures has 
furthermore analysed which forms of deprivations (‘afsavn’), caused by economy, these 
families did suffer from (Year 2000 and concerning all families with children). The lone-
mothers-group reported most deprivations but with a massive dispersion as 17% reported 
deprivations in relation to all questioned areas and 40% reported none. In two-parents-
families 78% of the women reported no deprivations. The most reported issue from the lone-
parent-group were no possibilities for holiday outside the home. To be able to replace house 
equipment; to go to hairdresser; to visit people - were other needs that could not be fulfilled 
(Hansen 2005). 
 
A rather substantial part of lone female parents is an underpriviledged group, especially as 
regards education, paid work and economic possibilities. This group has a relatively lower 
income. As to deprivations they seem to be in a considerably worse situation than others. At 
the same time, the above mentioned report stresses that lone mothers’ situation actually did 
improve during the last few years, as generally higher economy and employment in society 
has been beneficial for this group like for other groups as well (op.cit.). 
 
What does poverty mean for human beings? In Unterlid’s study concerning poverty and 
possible differences between ‘old’ and ‘modern’ poverty, he concentrates on poor peoples’ 
feelings connected to their situation. He interviewed 25 persons, living in Bergen, who had 
received public allowances over a long period (Unterlid 2005). Since both Norway and 
Denmark, according to Esping-Andersen’s ideal types of welfare states (as referred to in 
Pringle & Harder 1999), could be said to approximate to the Scandinavian welfare regime, I 
take the liberty of presuming that experiences of people in Norway and Denmark are to some 
extent comparable - even though we are increasingly aware of heterogeneity between the 
Nordic welfare systems.    
 
Unterlid outlines different conceptions of the poor during the centuries. The philanthropic  
or the public assistance approach has been regulated according to how poverty has been 
1In comparison, 10% of women in two-parents families are at a low educational level while 
15% of these are educated at an academic level (Hansen 2005)   
2This number has earlier been higher but during some years the situation has improved 
(op.cit.)  
3For the population as a whole these figures are 4,2% respectively 8,9% (op.cit.)  
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conceived - as a moral question, i.e. if the person in question had the will or motivation for 
taking care of herself (if not, the assistance takes form of punishment); if she had the abilities 
to do so but did not use them (assistance in form of treatment); or if she was unable to take 
care of herself (assistance would then be material and/or immaterial). From ancient to modern 
times, poor people have been dependent on other people’s desires to help. They have been 
expected to be humble and thankful for the help. They have also experienced that poverty is 
not ‘only’ about economy but that it influences other parts of life also (Unterlid 2005:23-4).  
 
The theoretical base of his study is theories of emotions and needs, a social cognitive 
perspective and a socio-cultural context (op.cit.:152). Unterlid found that emotional reactions 
about poverty could be placed in four categories: The aggressive category, the anxious one, 
the depressive and the category characterized by shame and guilt. He also found that these 
modern feelings did seem to be comparable to ‘ancient’ feelings of poverty. When he 
experienced positive feelings he also found that they were independent of the poverty 
situation (op.cit.:157). He saw such feelings and emotions as connected to unfulfilled needs. 
He specifically looked at psychologically and psyco-socially unfulfilled needs and found 
central ummet needs such as the need for security, the need for autonomy, the need of care 
and the need of self care (op.cit.:210). These are unfulfilled needs which have a strong 
influence on people’s capacity for participating in society. He underlined that poverty is 
heterogeneous, i.e. multidimensional; that it is continuous, processual and contextual. He also 
emphasized that new poverty is not so visible as it is easier nowadays to camouflage it. 
Nevertheless, poverty has a material side with practical consequences and an emotional side 
with negative psychological experiences (op.cit.:230-6). Unfortunately, Unterlid was not able 
to make distinctions between men’s and women’s reactions in situations of poverty. 
 
Unprivileged lone mothers and social services 
As Unterlid states, poverty also bring with it other types of under-privilegedment. Such, 
Halskov et al. emphasize (based on qualitive interviews with twenty lone mothers in 
marginalised situations) the difference between social policy in Denmark in general and 
(some of the) lone mothers’ reality. This difference or gap seems to expand over these years 
(Halskov et al. 2000:231). The contrast with the CASA study might be explained by the very 
different groups the two studies relate to. In the Halskov-study the women have experienced 
lack of helpfulness from social services. On the contrary, they felt they were met with 
suspicion and reluctance (op.cit.:234). The level of social support seems to decrease. The 
Halskov-study concludes that factors such as labour market discrimination, limited 
possibilites for education, lack of legal protection against family violence, isolation, lack of 
time and material ressources, lone responsibility for taking care of sick children and public 
stigmatization work towards loss of rights. These factors also have negative consequences for 
the children involved (op.cit.:263). In her doctor’s thesis concerning child protection Egelund 
states (on the basis of examination of social services’ journals) that lone-parent-families’ 
economic possibilities (or rather lack of them) do not seem to explain - for the social system - 
the families’ apparently ‘irresponsible’ behaviour. On the contrary, receivers of public 
allowances seem to be exposed to even stronger demands of an archaic character (Egelund 
1997:197).  
 
During the last few years public intervention in lone-parent-families has been even more 
intimate, according to Åkerstrøm Andersen. The ongoing development of social contracts 
between citizens and social administration/management tends to intrude into families’ 
intimate lives. Such a contract might concern how many hours and when the child should be 
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in its home; how often the family should eat together; how many different men who should be 
allowed access to the home by the mother etc. Andersen considers this development as a 
major shift in social policy and in the conception of the client but also as a regulative 
mechanism towards in- and exclusion (Andersen 2003). I consider this as a form of 
disciplining the client - though in a certain perspective, as it has the shape of a contract even 
if you can in no way speak about participants in symmetrical situations. It also seems in a 
strange way to suggest a touch of user involvement and self decision in it.  
 
Theory concerning societal intervention in families 
Habermas considers public intervention in family lives via law as a dilemma-filled area 
because the family institution and public social authorities represent different functions and 
principles. The system tends to colonize the life world, i.e. the system’s goal-rational 
operational capacity is constantly increased at the expense of the life world’s communicative 
rationality. This happens also when the system - with the law as a medium - intervenes in 
families, even if the life world does not necessarily feel this colonization. But when basic 
values are threatened, families might recognize that (Habermas 1996). This is what seems to 
happen when the parents of placed children approach the above-mentioned associations.       
  
I conceive Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition and, especially, the part of it which concerns 
the struggle for recognition, as a concretisation of Habermas’ colonization-thesis (Honneth 
himself might not agree to this). Honnneth’s  concept of recognition is differentiated in three 
spheres - the private one, the legal one and the solidarity sphere. Recognition in all of these 
spheres are central for human beings’ (good)  development. Each form of recognition 
expresses, at different levels, subjects’ relation to themselves. In the private sphere, love and 
care are central for creation of the child’s basic trust. In the legal sphere, legal rights (of 
different kinds) bring with them to a person the general recognition as is due for anyone else 
in society. This results in the person’s trust in herself as a full-fledged member of society. In 
the sphere of solidarity, people are sharing mutual values and norms. The feeling of belonging 
to groups or to society creates for the person a basic feeling of being worthy, which could be 
said to be a parallel category to basic trust (Honneth 1995, 2003). When people are in lack of 
recognition, or even directly denied of it, the basis for a positive development could be lost or 
reduced and the human being will, in accordance with the actual extent of the violation of 
love, rights or solidarity, suffer from fragile basic trust, feeling of being unworthy and of not 
being legally respected at the same level as other citizens. As to the recognition theory, these 
losses occur because human beings are deeply depending on recognition from other people 
and are only able to establish and to preserve a positive relation to themselves by 
confirmation from other persons (op.cit.). If we do not receive a sufficient amount of 
recognition, we might turn the feeling of this loss against ourselves (for example in the shape 
of abuse of drugs etc., or depression) or we might turn our reaction against the outer world.  
 
Philosophically, Honneth sees recognition as the overarching concept. This brings him in 
opposition to Habermas and also to Nancy Fraser. In their mutual book (Redistribution or 
Recognition ? - Fraser & Honneth 2003) she has suggested ‘justice’ as the superiour concept 
which according to Fraser places redistribution and recognition as subordinated but equal 
concepts.  
 
I will now turn to women’s position in society as Habermas considers it. And to the ‘danger’ 
of being in need for societal assistance. In Habermas’ discussion about legal policy 
(Habermas 1997), he uses women’s position in society to show how legal policy helplessly 
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swings between two traditional paradigms and how this will go on until the interplay between 
persons’ individual rights and citizens’ public autonomy becomes recognized. The original 
purpose with liberal policy was to uncouple status from gender identity and to secure for 
women a neutral equality regarding competition in the labour market; social status; education; 
political power etc. These efforts accentuated, however, the fact that women were actually 
treated in an inequal way. Welfare policy therefore reacted by creating special rules for 
women in female situations (conditions concerning childbirth, divorce etc.). Feminist 
criticism called attention to a row of other issues which should also be addressed and which 
were to a certain degree consequences of these  ‘special rights’. For instance, this is the case 
regarding women’s and mothers’ risk of losing their paid work; women’s higher share of low 
paid jobs; what Habermas calls the ‘problematic question of what is best for the child’ and the 
increasing feminization of childhood. Such discrimination might be caused by general 
classifications that the law uses in identifying these issues. But these classifications can at the 
same time lead to ‘normalising’ interventions in women’s lives. What was meant to be 
compensations (for being a woman), might be transformed into new forms of discrimination 
and therefore result in depriving women of freedom instead of extending their freedom. 
Habermas sees the creation and management of law as accompanying traditional patterns of 
interpretation and therefore contributing to consolidation of existing stereotypes. Habermas 
pleads for a procedural conception of right. The democratic process should at the same time 
secure private and public autonomy. Individual rights for women cannot be adequately 
formulated if the affected persons are not themselves involved in the articulation and 
justification of their demands (op.cit.).  Foucault would see an important power issue 
embedded in such struggles: that the fight for rights would concentrate the essence of the 
group and thereby be a tool for power (Foucault 2002a).                 
 
This brings me to Foucault’s thoughts about discipline and the ungoing inspection of the 
family. Foucault understands ‘discipline’ as control with bodily functions which ensures, on 
the one hand, a constant subjugation of the human body and its strengths; and, on the other 
hand, ensures that it reacts with compliance and usefulness - without being aware of it 
(Foucault 2002a). The human body thereby becomes a part of a power machinery which 
examines itself, separates itself and assembles itself (op.cit.:153-4). The instruments of power 
are anonymous. They have many tools: hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration, 
endless evaluation and classification (op.cit.:238). The examination combines surveillance  
techniques with the normalizing technique of sanctions. This concerns the relation between 
power and knowledge. Disciplinary power works by invisibility. The subjects are on the 
contrary quite apparent. They are placed in a documentary field and are classified as ‘cases’, 
i.e. objects for knowledge and fixed points for power (op.cit.:201-8). In the development from 
closed discipline (such as social quarantine) to the panopticon, the disciplinary society is 
created (op.cit.:233).  
 
What makes disciplinary power so effective is its ability to grasp the individual at the level of 
its self-understanding. As ‘subjected’, the individual is either bound to others by dependency 
or control, or to categories, practices and possibilities which emerges from normalizational 
and panoptic disciplines. Nancy Fraser characterizes the scenario of the perfected Panopticon 
as one in which “disciplinary norms have become so thoroughly internalized that they are not 
experienced as coming from without” (Fraser 1989 referred in Sawicki 1998: 94-5).  
 
How could this happen ? Foucault saw discipline closely connected to the period of 
Enlightenment. In the 18th century, the population was invented as an economic and political 
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problem. Number of births, of mortalities, of estimated time of life, of state of health and of 
homes were variables which were placed in the intersection of life and institutions (Foucault 
2002b:34). Foucault called it bio-politics (op.cit.:143). And here the inspection and 
examination also began. The discipline did not only concern the body but also the gender. 
During this development the issue of confession changed as well. According to Foucault, 
confession changed from the religious type and the type who showed your status and value to 
a type of confession where you confessed your own thoughts and actions. You confessed 
voluntarily - or you were forced to it. Foucault saw confession as an example of the fact that 
production of truth was permeated with power (op.cit.:63-8). This confession as well as the 
development of a set of conceptions about sexuality became crucial to the family institution. 
Sexuality could not be hidden or forbidden. Alternatively, sexuality became anchored in the 
family and thereby restricted. From the 18th century and onwards the family has been seen as 
the right place for affections, emotions, love, and the place where children should be born. In 
combination with disciplinary power, the need for confession and this installation of 
sexuality, the family opened itself for endless inspection (op.cit.:114-7). And it still is. But 
families do not any longer consist of mother, father, children. They can have all forms. It 
could be said that the conception of this former family has not left the minds of the 
inhabitants of the 21st century. If this is true, lone parents may fight not only with the 
administration and administrators of social law but also with old-fashioned ideas of the ‘real’ 
family, ideas that are difficult to bring to the surface and thereby to question them as they are 
more or less hidden in the veil of discipline.                     
 
It should also be stated that Foucault’s work since the early 1980's had a strong influence on 
feminists, especially in the United States of America. Specifically, the “History of Sexuality” 
became a key text. Some of his work overlapped with feminists exploring the micro-politics 
of private life. His emphasis on biopower opened up understanding not only about production, 
but also reproduction and sexuality and the demands for freedom connected to these issues 
(Sawicki 1998:93). Furthermore, he emphasized the challenges contained within marginalized 
and unrecognized discourses. His analyses of disciplinary power were used by feminists to 
isolate disciplinary technologies that subjugate women as objects and subjects and those that 
acknowledged domination. He tried to give oppressed groups a voice in the struggle over 
interpretations. He believed it was possible to alter particular normalizing practices and 
thereby make particular lives more tolerable. Foucault was, however and naturally, also 
criticized. Most feminists point to his androcentric gender blindness; others to his apparent 
lack of explicit normative foundations. And others again to the dangers of relativism, nihilism 
and pessimism often associated with his work (op.cit.:95-100).  
It should be said that Foucault in the early 1980s (he died 1984) entered into dialogue with 
critics who demanded criteria for distinguishing malevolent and benign or beneficial forms of 
power. And he softened his critique of the Enlightenment. “My point is not that everything is 
bad, but that everything is dangerous”, said Foucault in “The Subject and Power” (1983 ref. 
in Sawicki 1998:101). In response to, for instance, Habermas and Fraser he clarified the 
distinction between domination and power. An important question concerning society was 
whether it would be able to create a space for individuals’ liberty to transform the system. 
Foucault meant that people themselves should take care of this, since freedom could never be 
expected to be assured by the institutions and laws which formally should guarantee it. 
Foucault also, at that time, distinguished among forms of power such as exploitation, racial or 
ethnic hegemony and subjection. He did acknowledge systematic unequal power relations. 
And he attempted to provide tools for people struggling against subjection. He saw freedom 
as practice: “Liberty must be exercised” (Foucault in “Space, Knowledge and Power” ref. in 
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op.cit.:100-2). He continued to operate with liberal humanist values such as liberty, dignity 
and autonomy. And he saw humanism “dogmatically represented on every side of the political 
rainbow” (Foucault in  “Truth, Power, Self” ref. in op.cit.:102-3). 
 
Concluding comments 
There is in Denmark a rather substantial group (at least from a Danish perspective) of poor 
families with one female breadwinner. This does not mean that lone-parent-families, as a 
whole, are an exposed group. Most of lone-parent-families take care of themselves as do two-
parent-families. But some of them are in need of assistance from society (or the assistance is 
forced upon them). When those families approach the social system for assistance they do not 
feel themselves recognized for their actual efforts. On the contrary, they seem to be met with 
demands from ‘another culture’, maybe in the shape of ‘contracts’. Public assistance, when 
needed, is a right provided by the Danish welfare state (and the corresponding social policy). 
It seems to be an ambiguous one as it might be followed by increased surveillance. In that 
way, the intentions of the system’s integrational efforts might lead to the opposite - the 
experience of disintegration. Habermas sees integrational efforts as (also) including the risk 
of stigmatizing people. Foucault would rather draw the attention to the population’s need of 
seeing themselves as normal which calls for a ‘magic mirror’ showing the ‘abnormality’. 
Maybe this is a fair explanation of the fact that throughout hundred years, 1% of the child 
population has always be placed outside their homes. Foucault’s family inspection thesis 
might, furthermore, explain why most families with children, chosen to be placed outside 
their homes, are lone-mother-families. The efforts of incapsulating sexuality in a secure place, 
the nuclear family, might mean that lone-mother-families are conceived as a moral threat. The 
other issues characterizing those families: lack of paid labour,  mental and psysical illnesses 
etc. and a dayly life with deprivations might contribute to this conception. Even if Denmark is 
far from, for instance, American, English4 and other West-European levels concerning 
poverty in the population, poverty does exist in Denmark. One of the poorest groups is low 
educated and labour market marginalized women with two or more children5. As Unterlid 
emphasises, economic poverty is often followed by other forms of problems that make it 
difficult for people to participate in society at an equal level. That goes also for children in 
such families as they are co-carriers of the families’ conditions. Poverty also brings with it 
low self-esteem, the risk of feeling not-good-enough as a parent, the necessity of refusing 
children’s fair wishes about being able to give a friend a birthday-gift; to be participating in a 
school outing; to being dressed in new and modern clothes etc. Not only poverty exists in 
Denmark - inequality does also6. The group’s underpriviledged status leads to lack of 
recognition (lack of work is according to Fraser & Honneth especially leading to disrespect) 
4When comparing English and Danish lone mothers, older figures from EU shows that while 
lone female parents in Denmark in 1998 had a poverty risk of 10%, the figure for lone 
mothers in Great Britain was 24% (Munk 2002)   
5A European comparative analysis showed that social class, education and status of 
employment are decisive parameters in explaining poverty as is also the type of welfare state. 
It was also found that studies seldom are focused on gender differences (Munk 2002)  
6Even if Denmark is one of the world’s most equal countries as to income there are tendencies 
suggesting that this situation is under change. The Gini-coefficient regarding income/wealth 
differentials grew from 19,1 in 1995 till 21,9 in 2003 (Information September 22, 2005) 
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diminished possibilities for creating a fair life, i.e. a life similar to the majority’s lives. The 
women suffer from several difficulties and it is, on the one hand, likely that recognition and 
distribution will not be the answer to all families’ problems. On the other hand, it should be 
tested whether better economy and a more careful and recognizing attitude from the public 
authorities and maybe thereby from other parts of society would make children and women 
able to participate in society at a higher level. For the moment, the Danish government seems 
to go for a heavy reduction of public expenses to placements without no apparent intentions 
about redistributing the surplus of these cutbacks into the families themselves. On the 
contrary, a system of punishing the parents for their children’s unacceptable behaviour by 
reducing their benefits could be expected. 
 
It should be remembered that - even though children in Denmark have been placed away from 
home since1905 (and even before) - research on this subject is limited and existing research 
does not present convincing results of placement (see for example Vinnerljung 1996).      
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